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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Criminal Law-Infamous Offenses.-Attempted Burglary
Punishable as a Felony
"All misdemeanors," says the North Carolina Statute,' "where a
specific punishment is not prescribed shall be punished as misdemeanors
at common law; but if the offense be infamous, or done in secrecy and
malice, or with deceit and intent to defraud, the offender shall, except
where the offense is a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor, be guilty
of a felony and punished by imprisonment in the county jail or state
prison for not less than four months nor more than ten years, or shall
be fined." In State v. Surles,2 with one justice dissenting, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, construing this statute, held an attempt to
commit burglary infamous, and therefore a felony; thus affirming the
sentence of the trial judge that defendant be imprisoned in the State's
Prison for a term of ten years. Had the Court held the offense a mis-
demeanor, to be punished as at common law, the maximum penalty would
have been a fine, or imprisonment in the county jail, or both. Imprison-
ment in such case could not exceed two years.3
The offense of attempt to commit burglary has never been the sub-
ject of legislation in North Carolina,4 but in State v. Jordan5 our Court
held it to be a common law misdemeanor.6  At the time of this decision
the above statute covered only offenses made misdemeanors by statute,
and therefore the question of infamy was not raised therein.7
The real difficulty in applying the above statute lies in the want of
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-3 (1943).
"230 N. C. 272, 52 S. E. 2d 880 (1949).
B State v. Wilson, 216 N. C. 130, 45 S. E. 2d 440 (1939) ; "Recurring to the
many decisions imposing sentence for misdemeanors, we find none where a sentence
of more than two years has been approved." State v. Tyson, 223 N. C. 492, 494,
27 S. E. 2d 113, 115 (1943).
For a general discussion of North Carolina's penal policy see, Coates, Punish-
ient of Crime in North Carolia, 17 N. C. L. Ray. 205 (1939).
' Certain attempts have by statute been made felonies: "Attempted arson," N. C.
GEN. STAT. §14-67 (1943); "Attempted train robbery," N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-89(1943): "Attempted carnal knowledge of married woman," N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-
24 (1943).
'75 N. C. 27 (1876); but see State v. Harris, 120 N. C. 577, 579. 26 S. E.
774, 775 (1897) where the Court said: "Attempts to commit any of the four capital
offenses were formerly felonies, but during the prosecution for 'Kuklux' troubles
the offense of assault with intent to commit murder was reduced to a simple
misdemeanor." The Court seems to infer that an attempt to commit burglary,
one of the four capital offenses, has always been a felony.
'"All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use
within this state, or so much of the common law as is not destructive of, or re-
pugnant to, or inconsistent with the freedom and independence of this state and
the form of government therein established, and which has not been otherwise pro-
vided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are
hereby declared to be in full force within this state." N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1
(1943).
" In 1905, the statute was partially rewritten so as to cover "all misdemeanors,"
without regard to whether they arose at common law or were created by legis-
lative fiat. N. C. Ray. STAT. §3293 (1905).
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a rule by which infamous crimes may be designated with definiteness.
Two different tests have, in the past, been employed in determining this
question, and, as might be expected, have led to conflict in the decisions
as to what crimes are infamous. Under the earlier decisions,8 both in
England and this country, the courts inclined to the doctrine that it is
the nature of the crime, and not the character of the punishment, which
renders it infamous. But it is now well settled that the test to be applied
by federal courts, in determining whether an offense is an infamous
crime, is the character of the punishment which may be inflicted.9 The
North Carolina Court' ° and other state courts" have also adopted the
"character of the penalty" test, holding an infamous crime to be one
which subjects the offender to an infamous punishment. However, this
test is inoperative as a key to the meaning of the term as used in the
above statute, for the statute specifically applies only to those misde-
meanors for which no punishment is prescribed.
The federal doctrine and the doctrine heretofore applied in this
State being inapplicable, apparently the Court attempted to apply the
common law test, namely, the nature of the crime. This is evidenced
by the fact that the opinion stated that "infamous," as used in the statute
"necessarily refers to the degrading nature of the offense, and not to the
measure of punishment then being set down.' 2
At common law, the term infamous was applied to crimes disqualify-
ing convicts as witnesses and causing the suppression of their political
rights.' 3 They were enumerated as treason, felony, and the crimen
falsi.'4 The latter term would seem to cover "infamous misdemeanors,"
as used in the above statute. In the Roman Law, from which the term
was borrowed, crimen falsi is used to describe that class of crimes which
involve falsification, that is to say, forgery, false declarations or false
oaths such as perjury.' 5 Such an element is not present in an attempt
8 Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 At1. 861 (1920);
People v. Sponsler, 1 Dak. 289, 46 N. W. 459 (1876); State v. Vashon, 123 Me.
412, 123 Atl. 511 (1924).
'Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 5 Sup. Ct. 935, 29 L. Ed. 89 (1885); "It
is not the character of the crime but the nature of the punishment which renders
the crime infamous." Weeks v. U. S., 216 Fed. 292, 298 (2d Cir. 1914).
" Gudger v. Penland, 108 N. C. 593, 13 S. E. 168 (1891).
"' "Whether a crime is infamous or not is to be determined by the nature of
the punishment inflicted." Perry v. Bingham, 265 Ky. 133, 137, 95 S. W. 2d 1099,
1101 (1936) ; O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N. W. 550 (1936).
12 State v. Surles, 230 N. C. 272, 276, 52 S. E. 2d 880, 883 (1949).
" U. S. v. Barefield, 23 Fed. 136, 137 (E. D. Texas 1885) ; UNDERHILL, CRIM-
INAL EVIDENCE 332 (3rd ed. 1923); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw 41 (11th ed.
1912) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES 10 (4th ed. 1940).
1, U. S. v. Sims, 161 Fed. 1008, 1012 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1907). Drazen v.
New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 AtI. 861, 862 (1920).
""Infamous crimes are every species of the crimen falsi, such as forgery,
perjury, subornation of perjury, and offenses affecting the public administration
of justice." Wick v. Baldwin, 51 Ohio St. 51, 56, 36 N. E. 671, 672 (1894);
State v. Clark, 60 Kan. 450, 56 Pac. 767 (1889) ; I GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 373(13th ed. 1876) ; 1 BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd rev. ed. 1914) 730.
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to commit burglary. Neither is it present in an attempt to com-
mit buqgery; nevertheless, that was held to be an infamous mis-
demeanor in State v. Spivey,16 the Court construing the same statute.
In neither the Surles case nor the Spivey case did the Court advance
any criteria by which one might determine other infamous crimes. In
the Surles case, the majority of the Court, through Chief justice Stacy,
said that an attempt to commit burglary is "an act of depravity, which
involves moral turpitude, reveals a heart devoid of social duties and a
mind fatally bent on mischief," and therefore infamous. If this was
intended to be a definition of the term infamous, it seems the Court has
given birth to a new meaning of the term. This is especially true in
view of State v. Tyson' 7 where, in remanding a judgment, rendered
under this same statute, that defendant be confined for not less than
eight nor more than ten years, following a plea of guilty to assault upon
a female, it was said: "while his Honor found that the assault was
aggravated, shocking, and outrageous to the sensibilities and decencies
of right-thinking citizens, the Court did not find the offense to be
infamous."
In order to further strengthen its decision, the Court pointed out
that not only is the crime of burglary a felony,'" but that the mere
preparation to commit burglary is likewise made a felony by statute.19
"In between mere preparation and actual commission lies the crime of
attempt, which, if not a felony," said the Court, "undoubtedly arises
from an artless omission in the statutes. '20 It is submitted, by the writer,
that such is not necessarily an artless omission. The gravamen of the
offense of preparation to commit burglary is the possession of burglar's
tools without lawful excuse2 ' which seems to indicate that the statute
was designed to enable law enforcing officers to apprehend the profes-
sional burglar before the consummation of any crime. Even, if it be
conceded that there would be a discrepancy in the statutes if an attempt
to commit burglary was not a felony, it is submitted that the discrep-
ancy still exists since the maximum penalty possible for an attempt
to commit burglary is ten years while a sentence of twenty-five to thirty
years has been upheld under the statute against preparation.2 2 Besides,
it would seem that the duty to correct any such inconsistency, if such
exists, lies with the legislature and not the judiciary.
CHARLES E. KNOX.
1- 213 N. C. 45, 195 S. E. 1 (1937).
'223 N. C. 492, 493, 27 S. E. 2d 113, 114 (1943).
118 . C. GEN. STAT. §14-1 (1943).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §14-55 (1943).
20 State v. Surles, 230 N. C. 272, 277, 52 S. E. 2d 880, 883 (1949).
- State v. Vicks, 213 N. C. 235, 195 S. E. 779 (1938).22 State v. Cain, 209 N. C. 275, 183, S. E. 200 (1936).
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